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Abstract 
This paper examines the pricing anomalies resulting from the annual 
reconstitution of the Russell 2000 index and quarterly Initial Public Offering (IPO) 
additions to the Russell 1000 index and Russell 2000 index. We based our research partly 
on the earlier work of Biktimirov, Cowan, and Jordan (2004), which was essentially one 
of the first to examine the effect of index listing on smaller stocks. Our research differs, 
however, in that we used a later sample period for our tests, investigated the effects of 
IPOs now being added to the indexes on a quarterly basis, rather than just at the annual 
reconstitution, and ignored the trading volume analysis as well as the influences of 
institutional ownership. The results we found were mixed relative to the earlier paper as 
we obtained evidence of both temporary and permanent price effects stemming from 
changes to the indexes. In addition, we observed a much greater degree of volatility in the 
abnormal returns of the affected stocks, most of which were very significant at the 
various event intervals measured. 
Keywords:  Russell 1000 index; Russell 2000 index; Pure Additions; Pure Deletions; 
Upwards Shifts; Downward Shifts; IPO Additions; Abnormal Returns; Temporary 
Effects; Permanent Effects. 
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1. Introduction 
When indexing managers rebalance their funds each yeah around the reconstitution of the 
Russell indexes, or any annually reconstituted index for that matter, they must make a trade-off 
between minimizing the tracking error of their funds and paying a premium (absorbing a 
discount) for the stocks they must add to (remove from) their funds at the effective day. The 
announcement of changes made to the Russell indexes is generally made 20 days in advance of 
the reconstitution, so indexing managers have a choice on whether they want to rebalance their 
funds ahead of time. If they decide to rebalance early, they increase their tracking error risk, 
which would also be the case if they rebalanced following the effective day. Should they look to 
minimize their tracking error by rebalancing on the effective day, they risk paying a premium for 
the stock they must add to their funds and selling at a discount the stocks they must remove from 
their funds. One view is that these premiums and discounts are a result of price pressure, which 
is essentially a temporary change in the stock price created by supply and demand imbalances 
around the reconstitution. When a stock is say, added to a Russell index, indexing managers will 
drive up the demand, and thus the price, for the stock given a constant supply. Following 
reconstitution, however, the stock price should return to a level that reflects its fundamental 
value. This phenomenon is a potential problem for indexing managers since it would reduce the 
performance of their fund, or funds. If the premium or discount remains a permanent component 
of the stock price though, the indexing manager should be indifferent. Whether these premiums 
and discounts reduce is the question, or better yet, do these price effects exist at all? 
Prior to Biktimirov, Jordan, and Cowan (2004), considerable research has been done with 
respect to the stock price reactions of large capitalization stocks added to the S&P 500 index. 
Relatively few studies, however, have examined the stock returns of small capitalization indexes 
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like the Russell 2000 index. The work done by Biktimirov, Jordan, and Cowan (2004), was one 
of the first to thoroughly investigate the effect on smaller stocks of index listing. The authors did 
this by examining the stock returns, trading volume, and institutional ownership of companies 
added to and deleted from the Russell 2000 index from 1991 to 2000. Our research, in essence, 
picks up where the aforementioned paper left off in analyzing the stock returns of companies that 
are added to or deleted from the Russell 2000 index in addition to IPO additions to both the 
Russell 1000 index and Russell 2000 index using data from 1999 to 2008. 
The Russell 2000 index, as well as the Russell 1000 index, is a subset of the Russell 3000 
index, a value-weighted index of the largest U.S. stocks by market capitalization. The Russell 
3000 index is divided into the Russell 1000 index, which is the large capitalization index of the 
top 1,000 stocks in the U.S. and the Russell 2000 index, which is the remaining, smaller 2,000 
stocks. The Russell 1000 index represents approximately 90 percent of the U.S. equity market, 
while the Russell 2000 index represents approximately 8 percent of the total market 
capitalization of the Russell 3000 index. The Russell 2000 index is easily the most common 
benchmark for mutual funds that classify themselves as small capitalization, as it is constructed 
to provide a comprehensive and unbiased small capitalization barometer. While there are 
competing indexes, such as the S&P 600 index from Standard and Poor‟s, the Russell 2000 index 
remains the benchmark within the industry in terms of measuring small capitalization 
performance. As of mid-August 2009, the Russell 2000 index was trading around 572, down 
from its high in July 2007 of around 855. The average market capitalization of an average 
company in the Russell 2000 index is approximately $530 million, and the median market 
capitalization of a company included in the index is approximately $410 million. The largest 
market capitalization of a company included in the Russell 2000 index is $1.4 billion. The 
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Russell 2000 index is reconstituted annually to make sure that larger stocks do not misrepresent 
the performance and characteristics of the true small capitalization opportunity set, and this has 
made it the most quoted measure of the small capitalization segment of the U.S. equity universe. 
The mechanics behind the Russell 2000 index reconstitution are important to be aware of. 
Basically, a stock is added to the Russell 2000 index if its market value rises sufficiently or 
because its market value falls enough that it is shifted out of the Russell 1000 index. The same 
idea applies to stocks that are deleted from the Russell 2000 index or shifted into the top 1,000. If 
the market value of a stock in the Russell 2000 index falls enough, it is deleted from the index, 
but if its market value rises enough, it is shifted upward into the Russell 1000 index. Also 
important to know is that Russell Investments began adding IPOs to its indexes on quarterly 
basis in the third quarter of 2004, rather than just at the annual reconstitution. This change was 
meant to better represent the index, and perhaps a secondary objective of the change was to limit 
the strategies that aimed to profit from price pressure. 
Studying the original four groups observed by Biktimirov, Jordan, and Cowan (2004), we 
find evidence of both temporary and permanent price effects around the reconstitution day. The 
pure additions group exhibited transitory price effects, while those of the pure deletions group 
appeared more permanent in nature. When we broke out sample selection into pre- and post-third 
quarter 2004 periods, our results varied considerably. While the pure deletions group was 
consistent in displaying permanent price effects, the pure additions group produced results that 
showed both temporary and permanent price effects in the pre- and post-third quarter 2004 
periods. We contribute to the literature by considering two new groups in our study: the Russell 
1000 index IPO additions and Russell 2000 index IPO additions. These groups generally 
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exhibited evidence that discredited the price pressure hypothesis, since price effects tended to be 
permanent. 
2. Literature Review 
Papers studying the reconstitution index event can most of the time come to the same 
conclusion that deleted and added stocks experience significant abnormal returns. Despite similar 
results, academics do not agree on the hypothesis supporting those abnormal returns. Biktimirov, 
Jordan, and Cowan (2004) results support the price pressure hypothesis for stocks added to or 
deleted from the Russell 2000 index. This article is one of the few that studied the price pressure 
hypothesis using the Russell 2000 index. Combining the Fama-French Daily 3-factors model 
1993 (FF93) with the Returns Across Time and Securities (RATS) approach from Ibbotson 1973, 
Biktimirov, Jordan, and Cowan (2004) ran an Ordinary Least-Squares (OLS) regressions in order 
to test the null hypothesis that alpha equals zero. Using FF93 factors with the RATS approach 
has several advantages; it controls for size and book-to-market effects, it provides a large sample 
size compared to most other estimation methods, and it reduces the effect of any run-up and run-
down bias. Controlling for size and book-to-market effects is particularly important for analyzing 
the price effects at reconstitution for the Russell 2000 index because the index is dominated by 
small capitalization companies. Once the alphas are calculated, Biktimirov, Jordan, and Cowan 
(2004) calculate the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR      t1,t2) and look at any patterns in 
the pure additions and pure deletions groups. Biktimirov, Jordan, and Cowan (2004) conclude 
that additions and deletions returns are temporary and reverse to their normal level a few days 
after the reconstitution, which is perfectly consistent with the price pressure hypothesis. 
Biktimirov, Jordan, and Cowan (2004) also support the conclusion reached by Harris and Gurel 
(1986), even though the latter studied the price effects at reconstitution for the S&P 500 index, 
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which was observed over a different sample period. The findings of Biktimirov, Jordan, and 
Cowan (2004) are supported by an abnormal trading volume analysis as well as an investigation 
into the influences of institutional ownership. 
Goetzmann and Garry (1986) concludes that deletions from the S&P 500 index carry 
information. The analysis was performed for only one year (1983) and was limited to six 
securities. Excess returns are calculated by subtracting the index returns from the security return 
for each trading day. Goetzmann and Garry (1986) also examines the daily volume on each stock 
and found an abnormal volume for those six securities on the reconstitution day. Evidence from 
the paper suggests that prices drop in anticipation of future decreases in the quality as well as the 
quantity of information. The effect seems to be permanent. As the authors describe on page 68, 
“the „label‟ or S&P „seal of approval‟ seems to carry with it broadly understood implications. 
Removal of that seal has an adverse effect.” 
Harris and Gurel (1986) studied the price and volume effects associated with changes in 
the S&P 500 index from 1973 to 1983. The analysis is done following three different hypotheses:  
1. The efficient market hypothesis, which stipulates that the sale or purchase of a 
large number of shares from one investor will have no impact on the price if the 
other investors believe the former has no superior skills in evaluating stock prices 
or significant private information;  
2. The imperfect substitute hypothesis, which assumes that securities are not close 
substitutes for each other and that long-term demand is not perfectly elastic; and 
3. The price pressure hypothesis, which assumes that investors are compensated for 
providing liquidity and passive investors can be attracted to buy or sell stocks if 
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prices experience a significant change, therefore putting pressure on the price to 
return to its equilibrium.  
The conclusion reached by Harris and Gurel (1986) is consistent with Biktimirov, Jordan, and 
Cowan (2004) with respect to price pressure observed around the S&P 500 index reconstitution; 
the volumes increase as well as the prices for added securities. Harris and Gurel (1986) calculate 
the excess returns by subtracting the index daily returns from the stock daily returns. Their 
conclusion is that the effect is temporary because price increases are soon reversed afterwards. 
The methodology employed by Harris and Gurel (1986) includes a trading volume analysis. The 
findings of the paper, however, are based upon a limited sample size of only 86 additions and 13 
deletions. 
Jain (1987) suggests that price pressure does not simply come from indexing managers. 
Data used in the study extends from 1977 to 1983 and the sample size is relatively small with 87 
additions and 7 deletions. Jain (1987) uses a two-parameter (alpha and beta) model, similar to the 
CAPM, to calculate the intercepts. Jain (1987) also formed a control group to determine whether 
price increases (decreases) are the same in both the control group and the additions (deletions) 
group. The results strongly reject the price pressure hypothesis because both groups have very 
similar returns and t-statistics are small. The reasons behind this conclusion are not explicitly 
discussed, but the author lightly advances the information hypothesis. 
Whaley and Beneish (1996) examines whether the new rule of announcing the S&P 500 
index reconstitution changes five days before the actual reconstitution day in order to ease order 
imbalances has changed the overall effect from 1986 to 1994. The conclusions of Whaley and 
Beneish (1996) do not support the price pressure hypothesis since the increase in price does not 
disappear even two weeks after the reconstitution. The paper concludes that indexing managers 
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wait until the reconstitution day to buy new additions to the S&P 500 index. Consequently, stock 
prices increase after the announcement day and again after the reconstitution day. The price 
effect is almost equally permanent and temporary. The impact of the new rule, however, is 
greater because the average price increases are larger than under the former announcement 
policy. While other papers usually use the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) or FF93 to 
compute abnormal returns, Whaley and Beneish (1996) uses a future-based approach because it 
measures a viable trading strategy. Furthermore, returns are analyzed on a daily, overnight, and 
intraday basis. Whaley and Beneish (1996) is reinforced by a trading activity analysis, which 
includes trading volume, trade size, and quoted bid-ask spreads. Conclusions do not support the 
price pressure hypotheses since the objective of the paper was to examine the impact of changing 
the rules of the reconstitution for the S&P 500 index.  
The paper from Madhavan (2003) specifically examines the Russell index reconstitution 
from 1996 to 2002. The author calculates the monthly returns (and not the excess returns) 
between March and July. Madhavan (2003) concludes that a portion of the price pressure effect 
persists because of the risk and the unavailability of some positions and that the other portion is 
temporary. Another potential explanation for the observed permanent and temporary effects at 
the reconstitution day may be that investment banks are able to predict the members in the 
annual reconstitution list within a range of 90 to 95 percent, according to the author. Madhavan 
(2003) is reinforced by an intraday effect analysis and an econometric model that accounts for 
monthly ratios in the previous year and monthly volatility.  
Chen (2006) examines the annual reconstitution effect of the Russell 1000 index and 
Russell 2000 index from 1993 to 2000. Stocks are classified according to their style (value or 
growth) and index (Russell 2000 index or Russell 1000 index). The author measures the 
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abnormal return of each stock by subtracting the return of the associated Russell index from the 
stock return. The paper also analyzes the daily turnover of trading volume. Chen (2006) based its 
analysis on four different hypotheses:  
1. The imperfect substitute hypothesis,  
2. The price pressure hypothesis,  
3. The liquidity hypothesis, and  
4. The information hypothesis.  
Each of these hypotheses is thoroughly explained later in this paper. The reason why these 
hypotheses may hold is that indexing managers have a dilemma: to capture the potential return 
opportunity when the announcement is made and induce higher tracking error or to wait until the 
reconstitution day to purchase and sell stocks and minimize tracking error. As explained by the 
author, proponents of the Efficient Market Hypothesis will expect no abnormal returns between 
the announcement and reconstitution dates. The proponents of the imperfect substitutes 
hypothesis will expect a permanent rise in the price of the one added in the index. While the 
proponents of the liquidity hypothesis reach the same conclusion, they differ in interpreting the 
cause of those effects. The study aims to examine all the four competing hypotheses 
simultaneously. Chen (2006) suggests that the price pressure hypothesis fails to be validated 
because of the very weak results of the daily trading turnover. This study supports the imperfect 
substitutes hypothesis because the results are inconsistent with the price pressure hypothesis and 
the liquidity hypothesis. 
Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2006) found that price pressure is the greatest on the 
reconstitution day for the S&P 500 index and Russell 2000 index because indexing managers 
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want to minimize the size and volatility of their tracking error. They believe that indexing 
managers have no stock picking ability or timing ability and that arbitrageurs can take advantage 
of that opportunity. To have an arbitrage opportunity at the reconstitution, three conditions must 
be met:  
 Index changes are transparent and predictable, 
 The index is heavily used by passive index funds, and 
 Fund managers are constrained to trade on the effective day by tracking error 
metrics. 
With that being said, indexing managers must rebalance their portfolios at the reconstitution day 
or the day after. Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2006) employ a sample from 1989 to 2002 for the 
S&P 500 index and from 1990 to 2002 for the Russell 2000 index. Excess return measures are 
relative to the appropriate index. Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2006) conclude that investors in 
index funds lose money because of the indexing managers have a main goal of minimizing 
tracking error, and that arbitrageurs act as front-runners and take advantage of this fact. The total 
amount of money lost by investors in index funds linked to the S&P 500 index and the Russell 
2000 index is between $1.0 billion and $2.1 billion each year. The authors believe that the new 
IPO rule will have “no effect on index arbitrage other than to spread these additions and related 
index arbitrage.” 
3. Hypotheses 
Studies concerning S&P 500 index reconstitutions mostly see similar patterns, but 
reasons explaining the price pressure are divergent. Four basic hypotheses can explain a price 
pressure around an annual reconstitution: 
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1. The price pressure hypothesis (Harris and Gurel (1986)) advances that demand for 
stocks increase (decrease) around a significant event, which cause the prices to 
increase (decrease) as well, compensating market-makers for providing (reducing) 
liquidity during high-demand (low-demand) periods in order to bring the prices 
back to their equilibrium level. Price moves should totally reverse because 
additions to or deletions from the Russell 2000 index do not change the present 
value of future cash flows. 
2. The imperfect substitutes hypothesis (Shleifer (1986)) stipulates that as soon as 
one of two stocks with similar characteristics is removed from an index, the two 
stocks are no longer substitutes for each other. At the reconstitution, demand for 
additions exceeds supply and requires a curve shift to reach a new equilibrium 
price. 
3. The cost reduction hypothesis stipulates that stocks added to (deleted from) the 
Russell 2000 index become less expensive to trade. Liquidity increases, bid-ask 
spreads decrease (Amihud and Mendelson (1986)), and the cost of acquiring 
information about companies decreases (Goetzmann and Garry (1986)). These 
cost reductions lead to increases (decreases) in value for added (deleted) stocks. 
4. The information signalling hypothesis (Jain (1987)) stipulates that additions and 
deletions carry new and valuable information. This hypothesis is based on the 
S&P 500 index. The committee chosen to select additions and deletions exercises 
a judgement and the latter can be based on superior information and expertise in 
evaluating companies. 
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The first weakness of studying price pressure due to additions to and deletions from the 
S&P 500 index is the very small sample sizes. Whaley and Beneish (1996) has a sample size of 
103 additions. The article from Goetzmann and Garry (1986) uses only six deletions from the 
S&P 500 index. Conclusions from Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) were based on sample size of 
49 securities. To avoid that problem, we used the Russell 1000 index and Russell 2000 index. 
Russell Investments rebalances its indexes once a year and hundreds of stocks are either added to 
or deleted from the indexes. Since our study covers more than ten years of data, our sample size 
(more than 7,500 index stocks) can produce results that can avoid the criticism that research with 
less observations might endure. 
Another advantage of using Russell 1000 index and Russell 2000 index is that the 
condition for selecting stocks to add to or delete from the indexes is simple, transparent and not 
influenced by subjectivity, as opposed to the S&P 500 index where the selection is based on 
subjective quantitative and qualitative criteria. On the last trading day of May each year, Russell 
Investments globally ranks all eligible stocks by their total market capitalization. That is, the 
only criterion is the market capitalization. This methodology removes any ambiguity and makes 
the reconstitution more predictable. Both the announcement day and the reconstitution day are 
also known in advance. Therefore, the potential announcement effect on the reconstitution day is 
not present. Pure additions and pure deletions should not carry new information since the process 
of selecting stocks is transparent, known in advance, and based on information easily available to 
all market participants. 
The Russell 1000 index and Russell 2000 index have a third advantage in that even 
though stocks are deleted from the index, they are still trading after the reconstitution day 
whereas S&P 500 index deletions are very often no longer traded after the index rebalancing. 
 19 
 
S&P 500 index deletions are usually due to mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcies, or delisting, 
which limit the analysis to the days before the reconstitution day.  
Russell Investments also rebalances its indexes once a year for deletions and additions 
due to a change in market capitalization. IPOs are added quarterly to the indexes since the third 
quarter of 2004. Market participants can thus follow the Russell reconstitutions without investing 
too much time and money. The predictability of the index also makes it very transparent to all 
indexing managers. 
4. Sample Selection 
This study extends from 1999 through 2008. With the information provided by Russell 
Investments, all securities are classified in one of the six groups as follows: 
1. Pure additions are stocks added to the Russell 2000 index that were not previously 
in the Russell 1000 index. 
2. Pure deletions are stocks deleted from the Russell 2000 index that were not 
previously in the Russell 1000 index. 
3. Upward shifts are stocks added to the Russell 1000 index that were previously in 
the Russell 2000 index. 
4. Downward shifts are stocks deleted from the Russell 1000 index that were 
previously in the Russell 2000 index. 
5. Russell 1000 index IPO additions are stocks added to the Russell 1000 index that 
were not previously in either the Russell 2000 index or Russell 1000 index. The 
additions are due to recent IPOs that are added to the Russell Indexes on a 
quarterly basis. 
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6. Russell 2000 index IPO additions are stocks added to the Russell 2000 index that 
were not previously in either the Russell 2000 index or Russell 1000 index. The 
additions are due to recent IPOs that are added to the Russell Indexes on a 
quarterly basis. 
For pure additions, pure deletions, upward shifts, and downward shifts, Russell 
Investments rebalances its indexes once a year, usually on the last Friday of June. In order to 
ensure proper liquidity in the markets, when the last Friday in June is the 28th, 29th or 30th, 
reconstitution will occur on the proceeding Friday. Prior the third quarter of 2004, IPOs were 
added to the Russell indexes on an annual basis at reconstitution but without differentiation 
between pure additions and IPOs. Russell Investments modified this rule and began to quarterly 
reconstitute its indexes for IPOs only beginning in the third quarter of 2004. Consequently, we 
get ten annual reconstitutions and 17 quarterly reconstitutions from 1999 to 2008 (see Figure 1). 
Had we been able to get more than ten years worth of data from Russell Investments, we would 
have replicated the results of Biktimirov, Jordan, and Cowan (2004). We only had data, however, 
to extend the returns abnormal return analysis of the aforementioned paper. 
For each annual reconstitution and quarterly reconstitution, we examined each stock to 
determine which group it belongs to. In order for a stock to be included in one of the six groups, 
it must be certain for us to determine in which group the security falls into. The stocks that we 
were unable to classify into one of the six groups were removed from the study.  
We consider our sample size to contain enough observations so that the results can be 
reasonably relied on. We have 81 daily returns for each of our 7,502 stocks. The fact that Russell 
Investments makes many additions and deletions every year and every quarter makes the Russell 
1000 index and the Russell 2000 index very interesting to study compared to the S&P 500 index, 
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which is less active in adding and deleting stocks. We get 3,236 and 2,082 observations for pure 
additions and pure deletions groups, respectively. For the upward shifts and downward shifts 
groups, we have 912 and 778 observations, respectively. The number of observations we get for 
the Russell 1000 index IPO additions and Russell 2000 index IPO additions groups are 40 and 
454, respectively. 
We focused our discussion on the pure additions, pure deletions, Russell 1000 index IPO 
additions, and Russell 2000 index IPO additions. Less emphasis is placed on the upward shifts 
and the downward shifts because the impact related to these events are not easily classified in 
terms of the hypotheses they support. We present our empirical results in six tables, where each 
table presents the average abnormal returns and the cumulative average abnormal returns for the 
various groups and time intervals. 
5. Methodology 
We investigated the stock returns in the periods around the annual reconstitution of the 
Russell 2000 index as well as the periods surrounding the quarterly IPO additions to the Russell 
1000 index and Russell 2000 index. To compute the abnormal returns for each day, we use the 
RATS along with FF93. The RATS procedure gives the same weight to each observation. 
Combining RATS with FF93 allows the factors to change over time. 
As discussed in Biktimirov, Jordan, and Cowan (2004) using FF93 has several 
advantages. The first one is that FF93 automatically control for firm size and book-to-market 
effects. This is very important for our study because the Russell 2000 index is composed of 
approximately 2000 companies classified as small capitalization. The SMB factor accounts for 
this characteristic. The second advantage is that the data available on Kenneth R. French‟s 
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website provides a large sample size at a daily frequency, which not often the case with other 
studies. Since we have ten years of data from Russell Investments, an appropriate database 
covering that period was a necessity. Furthermore, FF93 is generally accepted as an appropriate 
approach to measure performance and to capture systematic patterns in average returns. 
To do this, we estimate the cross-sectional regression and run an OLS regression on each 
day in event time: 
Rjt − Rft = αt + βt (Rmt − Rft) + stSMBt + htHMLt + εjt. 
For day t, Rjt is the daily return of the stock j, Rft is the one-month Treasury bill rate, and 
Rmt is the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value-weighted return on all New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and NASDAQ stocks. (Rmt − Rft), 
SMBt, and HMLt are the Fama-French three factors at day t. The FF93 marketwide factors SMB 
(small minus big) and HML (high minus low) are constructed using six value-weighted stock 
portfolios formed on size and book-to-market ratio, respectively. SMB is the average return on 
the three small-stock portfolios minus the average return on the three big-stock portfolios. HML 
is the average return on the two high book-to-market stock portfolios minus the average return 
on the two low book-to-market stock portfolios. The estimate of αt is the average abnormal 
return for day t and is equal to zero under the null hypothesis of no abnormal performance. In 
this procedure, day 0 represents the reconstitution day. The average abnormal returns (AR    t) are 
simply averages of the alphas estimated previously with FF93. AR    t is calculated using the 
following formula: 
𝐴𝑅    𝑡 =  
 𝛼𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
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The AR    t t-statistics are calculated using the standard deviation of the daily abnormal 
returns (i.e. alphas) under the assumption that random variables are uncorrelated:   
𝑡 =  
𝐴𝑅    − µ
𝑠
 𝑛
 
 
where s is the standard deviation of the sample and n is the sample size. The degrees of freedom 
used in this test is n − 1. 
Testing the null hypothesis that µ= 0, we get 
𝑡 =  
𝐴𝑅    
𝑠
 𝑛
 
 
Daily cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR      t1,t2) are sums of the average abnormal 
returns over event time. CAR      t1,t2 is calculated using the following formula: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅      𝑡1,𝑡2 =  𝐴𝑅    𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
 
The CAR      t1,t2 t-statistics are calculated using the standard deviation of the AR    t under the 
assumption that random variables are uncorrelated. Under the Bienaymé statement, we have: 
𝑡 =  
𝐶𝐴𝑅      𝑡1,𝑡2
 𝑉𝑎𝑟  𝐶𝐴𝑅      𝑡1,𝑡2 
 ~ 𝑁(0,1) 
where 
𝑉𝑎𝑟  𝐶𝐴𝑅      𝑡1,𝑡2 =   𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐴𝑅𝑡)
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
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and  
𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝐴𝑅𝑡 =
1
𝑁2
 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
where N is the number of securities. 
We followed the exact same procedures that Biktimirov, Jordan, and Cowan (2004) did. 
Unfortunately, we did not replicate their paper due to unavailability of data.  
6. Abnormal Returns Analysis 
Table 1 and Table 2 present the results of the event studies for pure additions and pure 
deletions to the Russell 2000 index as well as upward shifts from the Russell 2000 index to the 
Russell 1000 index and downward shifts from the Russell 1000 index to the Russell 2000 index. 
Day 0 is the reconstitution day. Table 1 displays the average abnormal returns (AR    t), and the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR      t1,t2) are displayed in Table 2. In observing the pure additions 
group, the cumulative abnormal return over the 21-day period running from day -20 to 0 is 
1.32% (t = 3.57). Compared to the results of Biktimirov, Jordan, and Cowan (2004), the 
cumulative abnormal return in the (-20,0) window is very similar 1.89% (t = 4.45). It seems 
though, that a degree of anticipation exists in the market for these stocks being added since over 
the 41-day period running from day -40 to 0 the cumulative abnormal return is 7.63% (t = 15.04). 
That is, by successfully speculating as to what stocks will be added to the index before the 
announcement day, a speculator can realize greater abnormal returns than can be attained by 
waiting for the announcement by Russell Investments, which happens at approximately day -20. 
Biktimirov, Jordan, and Cowan (2004), found a cumulative abnormal return of 2.62% (t = 4.57) 
in the (-40,0) window that was also greater than that in the (-20,0) window; however, it was not 
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as great in magnitude. Interestingly, we found that the average abnormal return was an 
insignificant -0.40% (t = -1.67) on the reconstitution day. We expected to observe a positive and 
significant abnormal return on the reconstitution day as indexing managers do the bulk of their 
buying as to minimize tracking error, and this is consistent with the findings of Biktimirov, 
Jordan, and Cowan (2004) that observed an average abnormal return of 0.92% (t = 4.36) on day 
0.  Further, over the six-day period running from day -5 to day 0, the cumulative abnormal return 
was 0.11% (t = 0.51). This is an event interval that the former authors did not choose to 
investigate, but we believe that indexing managers willing to take on marginally higher tracking 
error risk would perhaps choose to do a most of their buying over this six-day period and thus, 
the cumulative abnormal return over this period would be positive and significant. Past the 
reconstitution day, Table 2 generally shows negative cumulative abnormal returns. Over the 20-
day period running from day +1 to day +20, we observe a cumulative abnormal return of -1.39% 
(t = -4.09). This result is comparable to that of Biktimirov, Jordan, and Cowan (2004) as the 
former authors found a cumulative abnormal return of -1.63% (t = -3.96) over the same event 
interval. In consequence, the positive cumulative abnormal return for the (-20,0) window is 
virtually offset in the (+1,+20) window in our study, just as it was in Biktimirov, Jordan, and 
Cowan (2004). The cumulative abnormal return over the (-20,+20) window is an insignificant -
0.07% (t = -0.15). This phenomenon provides strong support for the price pressure hypothesis, 
which suggests price changes around the reconstitution day are transitory in nature. 
In looking at the pure deletions group, we do not observe the same temporary price 
pressure seen with the pure additions group. That is, Table 3 and Table 4 show that the pre-event 
abnormal returns are generally negative, but these price changes are not reversed in the post-
event period and, in fact, the negative abnormal returns in the pre-event period continue in the 
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post-event period. The cumulative abnormal return over the 21-day period running from day -20 
to day 0 is -4.59% (t = -8.10), which was to be expected as investors sell the stocks that are to be 
deleted from the index once that information is known via the announcement from Russell 
Investments. This result is consistent with the cumulative abnormal return of -3.47% (t = -5.28) 
in the (-20,0) window observed by Biktimirov, Jordan, and Cowan (2004). On the reconstitution 
day, we found an insignificant average abnormal return of -0.50% (t = -1.44), which is consistent 
with the result corresponding to the pure additions group, but is inconsistent with the result we 
were expecting. Yet Biktimirov, Jordan, and Cowan (2004) also found an insignificant average 
abnormal return of -0.11% (t = -0.35) on day 0. For the event interval running from day +1 to 
day +20, we observed a cumulative abnormal return of -1.29 (t = -2.23), while we can see a 
cumulative abnormal return of 2.66% (t = 3.87) over the same (+1,+20) window from 
Biktimirov, Jordan, and Cowan (2004). So, unlike the pattern seen for the pure additions group, 
the negative cumulative abnormal returns for the (-20,0) window are not offset in the (+1,+20) 
window, and actually continue in this post-event period. Besides contrasting the pattern observed 
over the period running from day -20 to day 20 for the pure additions group, the price effect we 
see for the pure deletions group explicitly disagrees with what we see for the pure deletions 
group from Biktimirov, Jordan, and Cowan (2004). The trend observed for pure deletions group 
over the (-20,+20) window lends itself to the imperfect substitutes hypothesis, as well as the cost 
reduction hypothesis regarding the costs of acquiring quality information as analyst following 
gets smaller. The price changes for stocks deleted from the index then, seem to take on a 
permanent rather than temporary effect. 
The cumulative abnormal returns for the two pure groups for the (-20,+20) window are 
plotted in Figure 2. Through this illustration, it is interesting to see the competing patterns of the 
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two groups. For the pure additions group, we can see a transitory effect on prices; whereas, for 
the pure deletions group, it is clear that the price effect is permanent. Thus, it is difficult to 
accept one hypothesis over another in explaining the price changes of these two groups around 
the annual reconstitution. 
As mentioned earlier, we have no explanations for stocks that are shifted between the 
Russell 1000 index and Russell 2000 index since these stocks merely exchange one index 
affiliation for another, but we have reported the results for these two groups for the sake of 
completeness. From Table 2, we observe an insignificant cumulative abnormal return of -0.85% 
(t = -1.77) for the upward shifts group in the (-20,0) window and a positive cumulative abnormal 
return of 2.48% (t = 5.08) in the (+1,+20) window. Over the 41-day period running from day -20 
to day +20, the upward shifts group experiences a cumulative abnormal return of 1.63% (t = 
2.39). The downward shifts group experiences a cumulative abnormal return of -10.41% (t = -
10.45) over the (-20,+20) window, which is a large, seemingly permanent change in price. 
Together, the results observed for the two-shift groups present reasonably strong evidence in 
support of permanent price effects. 
Table 3 and Table 4 show the same four groups from Table 1 and Table 2, only the 
results here correspond to pre- and post-periods with respect to when Russell Investments 
introduced the practice of adding IPOs to the Russell 1000 index and Russell 2000 index on a 
quarterly basis rather than just at the annual reconstitution. This change became effective in the 
third quarter of 2004. The purpose of this new practice was partly to limit the opportunities for 
investors to realize profits from the types of transitory price changes that were observed in 
Biktimirov, Jordan, and Cowan (2004). Table 3 shows that on the reconstitution day, the average 
abnormal return of -3.72% (t = -8.20) for the pure additions group went from being significant in 
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the pre-third quarter of 2004 period to being insignificant in the post-third quarter of 2004 period 
in which the average abnormal  return was -0.05% (t = -0.16). A similar price effect change 
between pre- and post- third quarter of 2004 on the reconstitution day can be seen for the pure 
deletions group. Pre-third quarter of 2004, the average abnormal return for the pure deletions 
group on day 0 was 2.26% (t = 3.21); whereas, for the post- third quarter of 2004 time period, the 
average abnormal return on day 0 was an insignificant 0.37% (t = 0.72). The results from event 
intervals in Table 4, however, give a more comprehensive view of the outcome that having IPOs 
added quarterly has had on reducing transitory price effects. For the pure additions group, the 
cumulative abnormal returns in the pre-Quarter3 2004 period were -10.12% (t = -16.25) in the (-
20,+20) window. This result is puzzling, especially when considering the results from Table 2. 
Instead of realizing the similar positive cumulative abnormal returns over the period running 
from day -20 to day 0, the group experiences a cumulative abnormal return of -7.47% (t = -
16.24), and then for the period running from day +1 to day +20, the group experiences a 
cumulative abnormal return of -2.65% (t = -6.32). In contrast, the results for the post-Third 
quarter of 2004 pure additions group exhibit price behaviour that is more similar to that of the all 
inclusive time period, but much greater in magnitude and with a pattern that suggests the price 
effects are non-transitory. The cumulative abnormal return for the pure additions group post-
third quarter of 2004 was 11.11% (t =15.25) in the (-20,+20) window. Further, in the (-20,0) 
window, the cumulative abnormal return was 14.00% (t = 27.26) and in the (+1,+20) window it 
was -2.88% (t = -5.58). For the pure deletions group, the pre-third quarter of 2004 cumulative 
abnormal return of -0.19% (t = -0.18) for the (-20,+20) window was insignificant, but the post-
third quarter of 2004 cumulative abnormal return became a larger, negative number of -29.01% 
(t = -27.86) that was significant in the (-20,+20) window. Like the price effect observed from the 
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post-third quarter of 2004 pure additions group, the pure deletions group‟s price effect was 
permanent in nature, which is seen as good news for indexing managers. 
Table 5 and Table 6 present the abnormal returns for IPOs added to the Russell 1000 
index and Russell 2000 index each quarter starting in third quarter of 2004. On day 0, Table 1 
shows that the IPO additions to the Russell 1000 index group experience an average abnormal 
return of 1.98% (t = 3.19), which makes intuitive sense for reasons described above. The average 
abnormal return on day 0 for the IPO additions to the Russell 2000 index group, on the other 
hand, experience an abnormal return on -1.94% (t =  -9.23). From Table 6, we can see that over 
the (-20,+20) window the cumulative abnormal return for IPO additions to the Russell 1000 
index group are an insignificant 5.22% (t = 1.79). In observing a longer event interval, for 
example the (-40,+40) window, we can see a significant cumulative abnormal return of 18.41% 
(t = 4.35). The IPO additions to the Russell 2000 index group exhibit a similar pattern in the (-
40,+40) window, but the magnitude of the cumulative abnormal returns of 5.00% (t = 3.72) are 
much smaller. Further, over the event interval running from day -20 to day +20, the cumulative 
abnormal returns are 3.55% (t = 3.89), which demonstrates the price behaviour that is distinctly 
non-transitory. 
7. Conclusion 
Unlike Biktimirov, Jordan, and Cowan (2004), we did not find the same evidence of 
temporary price effects around the Russell 2000 index reconstitution. Our results were mixed in 
that for the pure additions group we observed price pressure, however, for the pure deletions 
group, it seemed as though price effects were permanent. For comparison sake, we cannot 
disagree nor agree with the hypothesis landed on by the former authors. Instead, we find 
elements of the price pressure hypothesis as well as the imperfect substitutes hypothesis and cost 
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reduction hypothesis as per the cost reductions of acquiring quality information of the stocks 
included in the index. 
When our sample selection was broken into pre- and post-event periods regarding the 
new IPO additions practice introduced by Russell Investments, our results generally displayed 
price effects that were permanent. Of course, this change was in part made to limit trading 
strategies aimed at exposing price pressure, so it seems that Russell Investments has achieved 
their goal. That is, with pure additions for example, indexing managers may need to pay a 
premium to buy these stocks, but that premium remains as a permanent price effect, so returns 
are not later reduced as they would be if this premium soon after diminished. Perhaps if this 
study is later extended to include a larger sample selection post-third quarter of 2004, it could be 
more obvious if the decision to add IPOs quarterly by Russell Investments has the desired effect, 
and improves returns prospects for indexing managers. 
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Table 1- Abnormal Returns for Four Groups Around the Russell 2000 Index Annual Reconstitution Date from 1999 
to 2008 
Trading Day AR t AR t AR t AR t
-40 0.23 2.28 ** -0.19 -1.28 0.40 2.96 *** -0.01 -0.05
-30 0.44 5.30 *** -0.49 -3.81 *** 0.16 1.58 0.46 2.88 ***
-20 0.26 2.54 ** -0.41 -2.84 *** -0.08 -0.50 -0.05 -0.23
-15 0.29 2.52 ** 0.19 1.04 -0.10 -0.75 0.14 0.70
-10 0.14 1.62 -0.26 -1.92 0.42 3.51 *** -0.63 -3.56 ***
-9 0.11 1.14 -0.68 -4.67 *** 0.15 0.96 -0.66 -3.32 ***
-8 0.12 1.40 -0.61 -4.20 *** 0.18 1.57 -0.26 -1.69
-7 0.29 2.19 ** -0.68 -3.31 *** 0.11 0.59 -0.65 -2.43 **
-6 -0.02 -0.18 -0.12 -0.76 -0.40 -2.82 *** 0.50 2.74 ***
-5 0.49 4.50 *** -0.21 -1.27 0.21 1.30 0.19 0.85
-4 -0.03 -0.35 0.03 0.25 -0.32 -2.75 *** 0.12 0.58
-3 0.17 1.83 -0.01 -0.06 -0.68 -4.46 *** 0.55 2.86 ***
-2 -0.65 -4.99 *** 0.45 2.35 ** -0.30 -1.72 -0.25 -0.96
-1 0.54 5.69 *** -0.08 -0.56 -0.62 -4.73 *** 0.91 4.35 ***
0 -0.40 -1.67 -0.50 -1.44 0.78 3.32 *** -1.69 -3.57 ***
1 -0.31 -2.48 ** 0.37 1.30 0.36 2.13 ** -0.64 -2.39 **
2 -0.07 -0.87 -0.25 -1.96 0.34 2.71 *** -0.72 -3.86 ***
3 0.31 3.72 *** 0.02 0.13 0.26 2.57 ** -0.46 -2.78 ***
4 0.18 1.37 -0.58 -3.45 *** 0.35 1.82 -0.47 -1.82
5 0.12 1.25 -0.45 -3.06 *** -0.12 -0.85 0.30 1.37
6 -0.11 -1.17 -0.07 -0.47 -0.02 -0.14 -0.46 -1.77
7 0.28 3.33 *** 0.16 1.19 0.41 3.57 *** -0.19 -1.31
8 -0.49 -3.77 *** 0.58 3.43 *** -0.02 -0.13 -0.21 -0.96
9 -0.24 -1.58 -0.24 -1.15 0.05 0.28 -0.07 -0.28
10 0.07 0.86 -0.23 -1.45 -0.10 -0.86 0.15 0.77
15 -0.04 -0.35 0.21 1.39 0.37 2.00 ** -0.08 -0.30
20 -0.31 -3.80 *** -0.01 -0.09 0.14 1.11 -0.13 -0.75
30 -0.08 -0.75 -0.28 -1.81 0.08 0.70 -0.09 -0.50
40 0.29 3.11 *** 0.34596 1.977 ** 0.11 1.06 0.12 0.68
***Significant at the 1% level.
**Significant at the 5% level.
t(AR t ) t(AR t ) t(AR t ) t(AR t )
Pure Additions to the 
Russell 2000 Index
Pure Deletions from the 
Russell 2000 Index
Upward Shifts from the 
Russell 2000 to the 
Russell 1000 Index
Downward Shifts from 
the Russell 1000 to the 
Russell 2000 Index
(N  = 3236) (N  = 2082) (N  = 912) (N  = 778)
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Table 2 - Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Four Groups Around the Russell 2000 Index Annual Reconstitution 
Date from 1999 to 2008 
Event Interval CAR t1,t2 CAR t1,t2 CAR t1,t2 CAR t1,t2
-10, -1 1.16 4.87 *** -2.17 -5.72 *** -1.24 -3.72 *** -0.18 -0.39
-10, 0 0.76 2.73 *** -2.67 -6.14 *** -0.46 -1.27 -1.87 -3.41 ***
 0, +10 -0.66 -2.35 ** -1.20 -2.60 *** 2.28 6.24 *** -4.47 -7.79 ***
 +1, +10 -0.26 -1.06 -0.70 -1.70 1.50 4.46 *** -2.78 -5.60 ***
-10, +10 0.50 1.37 -3.37 -5.64 *** 1.04 2.10 ** -4.65 -6.29 ***
-20, -1 1.72 5.06 *** -4.09 -7.78 *** -1.63 -3.57 *** -2.29 -3.61 ***
-20, 0 1.32 3.57 *** -4.59 -8.10 *** -0.85 -1.77 -3.98 -5.71 ***
 0, +20 -1.80 -4.87 *** -1.79 -2.90 *** 3.26 6.42 *** -8.12 -10.58 ***
 +1, +20 -1.39 -4.09 *** -1.29 -2.23 ** 2.48 5.08 *** -6.43 -9.04 ***
-20, +20 -0.07 -0.15 -5.88 -7.26 *** 1.63 2.39 ** -10.41 -10.45 ***
-40, -1 8.03 16.50 *** -10.54 -14.09 *** 1.98 3.08 *** -4.67 -5.25 ***
-40, 0 7.63 15.04 *** -11.04 -14.20 *** 2.76 4.19 *** -6.36 -6.80 ***
 0, +40 -1.88 -3.76 *** -2.12 -2.52 ** 3.53 5.22 *** -7.58 -7.43 ***
 +1, +40 -1.48 -3.08 *** -1.62 -1.99 ** 2.74 4.16 *** -5.89 -6.02 ***
-40, +40 6.15 8.80 *** -12.66 -11.24 *** 5.50 5.90 *** -12.25 -9.05 ***
-5, -1 0.52 3.07 *** 0.18 0.70 -1.71 -7.55 *** 1.52 4.49 ***
-5, 0 0.11 0.51 -0.32 -0.93 -0.93 -3.46 *** -0.17 -0.38
 0, +5 -0.17 -0.77 -1.39 -3.70 *** 1.97 7.05 *** -3.68 -7.98 ***
 +1, +5 0.23 1.34 -0.89 -2.87 *** 1.19 4.96 *** -1.99 -5.52 ***
-5, +5 0.34 1.23 -1.21 -2.63 *** 0.26 0.73 -2.15 -3.77 ***
***Significant at the 1% level.
**Significant at the 5% level.
t(CAR t1,t2 ) t(CAR t1,t2 ) t(CAR t1,t2 ) t(CAR t1,t2 )
Pure Additions to the 
Russell 2000 Index
Pure Deletions from the 
Russell 2000 Index
Upward Shifts from the 
Russell 2000 to the Russell 
1000 Index
Downward Shifts from the 
Russell 1000 to the Russell 
2000 Index
(N  = 3236) (N  = 2082) (N  = 912) (N  = 778)
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Table 3 - Abnormal Returns for Four Groups Around the Russell 2000 Index Annual Reconstitution Date from Pre- and Post- Third Quarter of 2004 
Trading Day AR t AR t AR t AR t AR t AR t AR t AR t
-40 0.99 5.89 *** 0.24 1.22 -0.07 -0.26 -0.35 -1.53 0.84 3.71 *** 0.24 0.98 -1.50 -4.66 *** -0.44 -0.80
-30 0.48 4.75 *** 0.08 0.06 -0.61 -3.79 *** 4.37 2.57 ** 0.13 1.09 -1.32 -0.68 0.35 1.86 2.02 0.67
-20 -0.10 -0.64 9.19 2.95 *** -1.32 -4.95 *** -20.15 -5.20 *** -0.12 -0.59 8.19 2.23 ** 0.04 0.14 -3.18 -0.66
-15 -2.82 -6.66 *** 0.20 1.29 3.92 5.20 *** 0.19 1.07 0.55 1.19 -0.16 -0.76 0.61 0.98 -0.20 -0.50
-10 0.16 1.15 0.93 2.64 *** -0.42 -1.74 -0.16 -0.31 0.68 3.35 0.58 0.95 -1.65 -5.72 *** 0.47 0.39
-9 -0.05 -0.28 0.33 2.44 ** -0.98 -3.24 *** -0.21 -1.18 0.30 1.07 -0.35 -1.39 -1.48 -4.31 *** 0.52 1.26
-8 0.10 0.90 5.10 5.86 *** -0.48 -2.36 ** -4.00 -3.75 *** 0.22 1.46 2.87 2.17 ** -0.31 -1.61 -2.55 -1.24
-7 -0.15 -0.74 -2.30 -4.46 *** -1.54 -4.12 *** -0.18 -0.25 0.39 1.52 1.89 2.65 *** -0.94 -2.69 *** -2.49 -2.56 **
-6 0.00 -0.03 -0.39 -2.20 ** -0.41 -2.14 ** -0.54 -1.40 -0.46 -2.53 -0.08 -0.22 0.49 2.22 ** 0.12 0.15
-5 0.52 3.06 *** -0.11 -0.56 -0.30 -1.09 0.99 3.53 *** -0.18 -0.74 0.04 0.12 0.82 2.71 *** -1.16 -1.91
-4 0.00 -0.03 0.46 2.25 ** 0.52 2.20 ** 0.45 2.00 ** -0.72 -3.69 -0.35 -1.57 0.75 2.35 ** 0.97 2.16 **
-3 0.41 2.24 ** 0.17 1.21 -1.13 -3.06 *** 0.32 1.63 -0.65 -2.23 -0.23 -0.73 0.39 1.06 0.21 0.40
-2 -1.73 -7.05 *** -0.23 -2.00 ** 2.09 4.92 *** -0.17 -0.96 -0.67 -2.05 0.01 0.06 -0.52 -1.17 0.20 1.04
-1 -0.14 -0.89 -2.00 -2.78 *** 0.87 3.30 *** 2.37 3.13 *** 0.16 0.77 2.17 1.80 -0.31 -0.89 -1.98 -0.79
0 -3.72 -8.20 *** -0.05 -0.16 2.26 3.21 *** 0.37 0.72 1.02 2.48 1.74 4.02 *** -5.09 -5.92 *** -1.86 -2.77 ***
1 -0.62 -3.79 *** 0.11 0.61 1.69 3.89 *** -0.84 -3.40 *** 0.83 3.73 -0.55 -1.84 -0.35 -1.03 0.81 1.25
2 0.18 1.78 -0.67 -5.22 *** 0.26 1.53 -0.96 -5.30 *** 0.38 2.35 0.18 1.29 -0.62 -2.68 *** -0.92 -3.36 ***
3 0.63 5.18 *** -0.64 -3.16 *** -0.21 -1.13 1.06 4.03 *** 0.49 3.63 0.05 0.27 -0.51 -2.29 ** -0.38 -1.22
4 0.08 0.33 0.07 0.34 -1.24 -3.33 *** -0.15 -0.68 0.78 1.96 0.03 0.09 -0.41 -0.86 -0.93 -1.04
5 0.72 4.54 *** -0.05 -0.22 -1.32 -4.78 *** 0.08 0.33 0.18 0.86 0.72 2.55 ** -0.43 -1.33 0.01 0.02
6 -0.40 -2.65 *** 0.67 1.16 0.51 2.10 ** -0.85 -0.97 -0.87 -2.78 0.20 0.35 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.05
7 0.21 2.03 ** 0.51 3.55 *** 0.11 0.62 0.27 1.40 0.39 2.79 0.06 0.21 -0.36 -2.10 ** 0.00 0.00
8 -0.47 -3.08 *** -0.65 -2.57 ** 0.51 2.41 ** 1.16 4.07 *** -0.09 -0.45 0.48 1.52 -0.26 -1.03 0.91 1.83
9 -0.92 -2.41 ** -1.65 -5.29 *** -0.08 -0.13 -0.32 -0.69 -0.07 -0.13 -0.90 -2.49 ** 1.32 2.11 ** -0.72 -0.75
10 0.24 2.06 ** -0.37 -1.77 -0.16 -0.68 -1.04 -2.85 *** 0.14 0.89 -1.26 -4.50 *** -0.19 -0.92 0.17 0.21
15 -0.72 -1.31 -0.38 -1.46 -0.36 -0.39 0.10 0.31 1.57 2.04 -0.13 -0.41 -0.17 -0.16 -0.31 -0.70
20 -0.49 -3.45 *** 0.43 2.37 ** -0.15 -0.54 0.40 1.52 -0.36 -1.46 0.40 1.90 0.10 0.32 -0.55 -1.76
30 -0.13 -0.99 -0.33 -1.65 -0.24 -1.19 -0.36 -1.50 0.25 1.62 -0.51 -2.82 *** -0.15 -0.70 0.38 0.98
40 0.36 3.47 *** -0.05 -0.09 0.42 1.88 0.21 0.37 0.12 1.04 4.46 6.02 *** -0.03 -0.15 -1.27 -0.71
***Significant at the 1% level.
**Significant at the 5% level.
Pure Additions to the 
Russell 2000 Index Pre Q4 
2004
Pure Additions to the 
Russell 2000 Index Post 
Q4 2004
Pure Deletions from the 
Russell 2000 Index Pre 
Q4 2004
Pure Deletions from the 
Russell 2000 Index Post 
Q4 2004
Upward Shifts from the 
Russell 2000 to the 
Russell 1000 Index Pre 
Q4 2004
Upward Shifts from the 
Russell 2000 to the 
Russell 1000 Index Post 
Q4 2004
Downward Shifts from 
the Russell 1000 to the 
Russell 2000 Index Pre 
Q4 2004
Downward Shifts from 
the Russell 1000 to the 
Russell 2000 Index Post 
Q4 2004
(N  = 673) (N  = 239) (N  = 591) (N  = 187)
t(AR t ) t(AR t ) t(AR t ) t(AR t ) t(AR t ) t(AR t ) t(AR t ) t(AR t )
(N  = 2391) (N  = 845) (N  = 1367) (N  = 715)
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Table 4 - Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Four Groups Around the Russell 2000 Index Annual Reconstitution Date from Pre- and Post-Third Quarter of 2004 
Event Interval CAR t1,t2 CAR t1,t2 CAR t1,t2 CAR t1,t2 CAR t1,t2 CAR t1,t2 CAR t1,t2 CAR t1,t2
-10, -1 -0.89 -2.97 *** 1.96 5.96 *** -1.78 -3.48 *** -1.13 -2.45 ** -0.94 -2.20 ** 6.54 16.65 *** -2.77 -4.86 *** -5.68 -9.27 ***
-10, 0 -4.60 -13.19 *** 1.91 5.36 *** 0.48 0.82 -0.77 -1.50 0.09 0.19 8.28 19.75 *** -7.86 -11.67 *** -7.54 -11.69 ***
 0, +10 -4.08 -11.70 *** -2.73 -7.02 *** 2.33 3.81 *** -1.24 -2.23 ** 3.19 6.98 *** 0.75 1.62 -6.90 -10.16 *** -2.80 -2.96 ***
 +1, +10 -0.36 -1.22 -2.67 -7.35 *** 0.08 0.14 -1.60 -3.14 *** 2.17 5.12 *** -0.99 -2.25 ** -1.81 -3.14 *** -0.94 -1.02
-10, +10 -4.97 -10.82 *** -0.76 -1.50 0.55 0.70 -2.37 -3.28 *** 2.26 3.62 *** 7.29 12.00 *** -9.67 -10.91 *** -8.49 -7.53 ***
-20, -1 -3.75 -8.87 *** 14.05 28.37 *** -1.79 -2.52 ** -20.18 -32.06 *** -0.24 -0.41 18.92 33.75 *** -5.85 -7.52 *** -8.15 -9.66 ***
-20, 0 -7.47 -16.24 *** 14.00 27.26 *** 0.47 0.61 -19.81 -29.73 *** 0.78 1.30 20.66 35.66 *** -10.94 -12.77 *** -10.01 -11.54 ***
 0, +20 -6.37 -13.93 *** -2.94 -5.49 *** 1.60 1.99 ** -8.83 -10.65 *** 5.10 8.09 *** -2.50 -3.49 *** -10.27 -11.41 *** -4.58 -3.38 ***
 +1, +20 -2.65 -6.32 *** -2.88 -5.58 *** -0.66 -0.88 -9.20 -11.50 *** 4.08 6.72 *** -4.24 -6.06 *** -5.18 -6.28 *** -2.72 -2.03 **
-20, +20 -10.12 -16.25 *** 11.11 15.25 *** -0.19 -0.18 -29.01 -27.86 *** 4.86 5.68 *** 16.43 18.08 *** -16.13 -13.56 *** -12.72 -7.97 ***
-40, -1 3.30 5.47 *** 6.12 8.53 *** -6.23 -6.21 *** -12.62 -13.25 *** 2.41 3.00 *** 8.69 9.49 *** -9.52 -8.85 *** -8.39 -6.28 ***
-40, 0 -0.41 -0.65 6.06 8.30 *** -3.98 -3.81 *** -12.26 -12.54 *** 3.43 4.19 *** 10.43 11.25 *** -14.61 -12.88 *** -10.25 -7.59 ***
 0, +40 -8.33 -13.58 *** 13.79 17.55 *** 3.10 2.84 *** -7.15 -6.24 *** 5.22 6.26 *** -30.33 -30.49 *** -9.41 -7.88 *** -17.52 -9.55 ***
 +1, +40 -4.61 -7.87 *** 13.85 17.89 *** 0.84 0.80 -7.51 -6.69 *** 4.20 5.14 *** -32.08 -32.60 *** -4.32 -3.79 *** -15.65 -8.59 ***
-40, +40 -5.02 -5.84 *** 19.91 18.71 *** -3.14 -2.12 ** -19.77 -13.28 *** 7.63 6.59 *** -21.64 -16.01 *** -18.93 -11.77 *** -25.91 -11.42 ***
-5, -1 -0.94 -4.52 *** -1.72 -7.04 *** 2.05 5.83 *** 3.96 12.03 *** -2.06 -7.32 *** 1.64 5.66 *** 1.12 2.73 *** -1.75 -3.94 ***
-5, 0 -4.65 -16.92 *** -1.77 -6.34 *** 4.31 9.52 *** 4.32 10.94 *** -1.04 -3.15 *** 3.38 10.42 *** -3.97 -7.28 *** -3.61 -7.40 ***
 0, +5 -2.74 -9.83 *** -1.23 -4.03 *** 1.44 2.84 *** -0.45 -1.08 3.70 10.65 *** 2.17 6.32 *** -7.41 -13.15 *** -3.27 -5.45 ***
 +1, +5 0.98 4.63 *** -1.18 -4.31 *** -0.82 -1.96 -0.81 -2.32 ** 2.67 8.86 *** 0.43 1.38 -2.32 -5.34 *** -1.40 -2.49 **
-5, +5 -3.68 -10.58 *** -2.94 -7.55 *** 3.49 5.66 *** 3.51 6.65 *** 1.63 3.65 *** 3.81 8.48 *** -6.28 -9.02 *** -5.02 -6.73 ***
***Significant at the 1% level.
**Significant at the 5% level.
(N  = 673)
Pure Additions to the 
Russell 2000 Index Pre 
Q4 2004
Pure Additions to the 
Russell 2000 Index Post 
Q4 2004
Pure Deletions from the 
Russell 2000 Index Pre 
Q4 2004
Pure Deletions from the 
Russell 2000 Index Post 
Q4 2004
Upward Shifts from the 
Russell 2000 to the 
Russell 1000 Index Pre 
Q4 2004
Upward Shifts from the 
Russell 2000 to the 
Russell 1000 Index Post 
Q4 2004
Downward Shifts from 
the Russell 1000 to the 
Russell 2000 Index Pre 
Q4 2004
Downward Shifts from 
the Russell 1000 to the 
Russell 2000 Index Post 
Q4 2004
(N  = 239) (N  = 591) (N  = 187)
t(CAR t1,t2 ) t(CAR t1,t2 ) t(CAR t1,t2 ) t(CAR t1,t2 ) t(CAR t1,t2 ) t(CAR t1,t2 ) t(CAR t1,t2 ) t(CAR t1,t2 )
(N  = 2391) (N  = 845) (N  = 1367) (N  = 715)
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Table 5 - Abnormal Returns for Two Groups Around the Quarterly Reconstitution Date for the Russell 
1000 Index and Russell 2000 Index  from the Third Quarter of 2004  to the Third Quarter of 
2008 
Trading Day AR t AR t
-40 0.15 0.19 -0.06 -0.29
-30 0.55 1.07 -0.02 -0.11
-20 0.40 1.22 0.34 2.27 **
-15 0.68 1.08 0.13 0.64
-10 -0.24 -0.67 0.32 2.59 ***
-9 0.40 1.01 0.25 1.54
-8 0.80 1.66 0.34 1.89
-7 0.19 0.37 -0.46 -2.36 **
-6 1.01 1.40 -0.02 -0.19
-5 -0.21 -0.51 0.52 4.10 ***
-4 0.16 0.33 -0.05 -0.34
-3 -0.67 -1.82 -0.14 -1.13
-2 -0.47 -1.38 0.13 0.88
-1 -0.10 -0.20 -0.39 -2.54 **
0 1.98 3.19 *** -1.94 -9.23 ***
1 1.47 3.45 *** 0.98 4.02 ***
2 -0.23 -0.56 0.22 1.42
3 0.74 1.26 0.38 2.26 **
4 -0.55 -1.29 0.18 1.33
5 -0.35 -1.20 0.46 3.18 ***
6 -1.71 -1.36 0.34 2.17 **
7 0.57 1.08 0.46 3.03 ***
8 0.79 1.04 0.20 1.21
9 -1.25 -1.35 0.12 0.65
10 -0.92 -1.90 -0.05 -0.32
15 0.29 0.52 0.08 0.51
20 0.35 0.64 0.25 1.48
30 -0.43 -0.95 -0.31 -2.13 **
40 0.19 0.44 0.06 0.34
***Significant at the 1% level.
**Significant at the 5% level.
t(AR t )
(N  = 454)
IPO Additions to the Russell 2000 Index
t(AR t )
IPO Additions to the Russell 1000 Index
(N  = 40)
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Table 6 - Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Two Groups Around the Quarterly Reconstitution Date for the 
Russell 1000 Index and Russell 2000 Index  from the Third Quarter of 2004  to the Third 
Quarter of 2008 
Event Interval CAR t1,t2 CAR t1,t2
-10, -1 0.87 0.70 0.50 1.15
-10, 0 2.85 2.15 ** -1.44 -3.08 ***
 0, +10 0.53 0.30 1.36 2.78 ***
 +1, +10 -1.45 -0.84 3.29 7.21 ***
-10, +10 1.40 0.65 1.86 2.84 ***
-20, -1 1.85 1.08 1.18 1.91
-20, 0 3.84 2.15 ** -0.76 -1.18
 0, +20 3.37 1.43 2.37 3.53 ***
 +1, +20 1.38 0.60 4.31 6.64 ***
-20, +20 5.22 1.79 3.55 3.89 ***
-40, -1 15.87 5.36 *** 2.76 2.89 ***
-40, 0 17.85 5.95 *** 0.83 0.85
 0, +40 2.54 0.84 2.24 2.37 **
 +1, +40 0.56 0.19 4.18 4.49 ***
-40, +40 18.41 4.35 *** 5.00 3.72 ***
-5, -1 -1.29 -1.54 0.07 0.24
-5, 0 0.69 0.71 -1.87 -5.53 ***
 0, +5 3.06 3.35 *** 0.28 0.76
 +1, +5 1.08 1.39 2.22 6.88 ***
-5, +5 1.76 1.42 0.35 0.75
***Significant at the 1% level.
**Significant at the 5% level.
t(CAR t1,t2 ) t(CAR t1,t2 )
IPO Additions to the Russell 1000 Index IPO Additions to the Russell 2000 Index
(N  = 40) (N  = 454)
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Figure 1- Reconstitution Dates 
Annual Reconstitution Quarterly Reconstitution 
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Figure 2 - Cumulative Average Returns for Pure Additions (PA) and Pure Deletions (PD) for the (-20,+20) 
Window 
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